Maryland Law Review
Volume 22 | Issue 4

Article 9

Book Review

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Recommended Citation
Book Review, 22 Md. L. Rev. 364 (1962)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol22/iss4/9

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXII

anan v. Marcusen, 196 Minn. 520, 265 N.W. 319 (1936).
For further reference see BABBITT, MOTOR VEHICLE LAW
(4th ed. 1933) §§ 1799, 1800; BRUNE, MOTOR VEHIcLE LAW
OF MARYLAND (1928) §§ 20, 22; 3 M.L.E., Automobiles,
§§ 103, 175; 11 Md. L. Rev. 1 (1950).

Book Review
One Man's Freedom. By Edward Bennett Williams.
New York. Atheneum, 1962, Pp. 344, including index. $5.95.
In his introduction to this very readable, timely and
provocative book, Eugene V. Rostow, Dean of Yale Law
School, makes the observation that, "The quality of a
civilization is largely determined by the fairness of its
criminal trials, and of its other proceedings in which
men may lose their liberty, their reputation, or their right
to pursue callings of their choice."1 Dean Rostow acknowledges the author of this book to have demonstrated
that an honorable lawyer can have an exciting life representing persons accused of crime, in spite of the barriers
frequently faced by those genuinely concerned with the
healthy and orderly development of our constitutional law
of civil and criminal rights. The inclination of the public
to identify the lawyer with his client and the corruption
with which the criminal practice is sometimes infested are
very real obstacles to be encountered along the high road
chosen by Mr. Williams in his pursuit of constitutional
liberty through law.
Mr. Williams, in the early pages of his book, chronicles
the start of his legal career with a highly respected Washington firm, where he soon became disenchanted with the
law in its relation to property rights. After several years
of "representing the local streetcar company, a galaxy of
insurance companies and other corporate interests, usually
defending them against damage suits",2 the author opened
a small office of his own in Washington, where his practice
turned to problems of the law in its relationship to human
rights, resulting in his handling of cases concerned principally with constitutional issues, and questions involving
civil liberties on both the civil and criminal sides of the
I Williams, ix.
2Id.,
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court. As a result of this metamorphis, and the causes in
which he has subsequently appeared as advocate, Mr.
Williams has developed some tenacious ideas about the
protection of the individual. These ideas deal with what
he regards as basic principles of individual liberty guaranteed by our Constitution, and he spells out his legal credo
in fervent terms: "that ours is a government of rules laws - not of men. The rules and laws are applicable
alike to rich and poor, strong and weak, guilty and innocent."3 While Mr. Williams' legal philosophy is neither
profound nor novel, it is nonetheless refreshing, especially
so at a time when the legal profession has become highly
specialized, and lawyers are increasingly finding themselves of necessity devoting a vast amount of their time
to the commercial or business aspects of the practice,
having neither time nor motivation to consider the concept
of rule of law.
In the past decade Mr. Williams has been counsel in
more causes celebres than perhaps any other lawyer on
the American scene; although Louis Nizer at the moment
appears to be running a close second.4 In his relatively
brief and spectacular career Mr. Williams has represented, among others, the late Senator Joseph McCarthy,
Frank Costello, David Beck, Bernard Goldfine, Robert
Harrison, the publisher of Confidential Magazine, Jimmy
Hoffa, Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., Igor
Melekh, a Russian employee of the United Nations indicted for espionage against the United States, and Aldo
Icardi, the Army Lieutenant convicted in absentia by the
Italian courts of murdering his commanding officer behind
enemy lines during World War II while on a secret mission
for the Office of Strategic Services.
As a major premise, Mr. Williams candidly makes the
point that some of the most basic principles of individual
liberty and freedom guaranteed by our Constitution have
become imperiled, because of collective lethargy and a
cavalier attitude of unconcern. He suggests, for instance,
that "the majority of Americans would trade away the
right to speak in public assembly, the privilege against
self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, the right to be
secure from unreasonable police searches, the right to
indictment by grand jury, the right to confront an accuser
and the right to counsel . . . for a guarantee of total
AId., 7.
"Mr. Nizer's book, My Life in Court, was reviewed in 22 Md. L. Rev.
1, 85 (1962). [Ed.]
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economic security until death. ' 5 He fervently contends
that individual liberty is being subordinated to the overriding issues of peace and security. Whether or not you
are in entire agreement with his major premise, you will
no doubt be persuaded to this view by at least some of his
experiences while taking on various branches of the U. S.
Government, the causes he has advocated in the court room
and his forthright espousal of fundamental American
freedoms. In developing his premise, the author has documented his convictions and illustrated his principles in a
most effective and persuasive manner. In fact, he has
gotten a pretty interesting and thought-provoking load off
his chest. In doing so, he has developed a number of interesting themes in his book:
(1) That although the Supreme Court has repeatedly
condemned the view that the invocation of the privilege
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution is an admission of guilt or a conclusive
presumption of perjury, very serious consequences may
result to the individual who does so. In suggesting that the
right to silence is fundamental and that the individual
should invoke the privilege rather than inform on others,
or reveal truths when there is no valid basis for compelling
him to do so, even at the risk of incurring the wrath of an
aroused society, the author states that:
"The freedom of the individual as we have known
it since the birth of this nation will be at an end if the
time ever comes when the state can confront the suspected person with conviction if he confesses guilt,
perjury if he denies it and contempt if he stands silent."6
(2) That many Congressional committees expose for the
sake of exposure, in spite of the Supreme Court's express
prohibition against such activity in the Watkins case.7
The author recognizes the right of the American people
to be kept informed about the operations of their government, including the establishment of Congressional committees, but contends that such committees have gone far
beyond their legitimate powers of investigating the operation of the Government or gathering information to use
in drafting or amending legislation. Mr. Williams suggests
that both Houses of Congress adopt a code of procedure
5

Williams, 9.
6Id., 144.
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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which would embody certain proposals suggested by the
author, many of which appear to have considerable merit,
and could have the highly desirable result of preventing
an irresponsible minority of investigators from frustrating
the objectives of the responsible majority.
(3) That the Courts have yet to achieve the delicate balancing of the rights of the press and the rights of an
accused. Mr. Williams does not advocate the system in
effect in England, where editors, who permit the publication of news items which prejudice the right of the defendant to a fair trial by an impartial jury, may be punished for contempt. He points out that although this system
does accomplish one objective, the right of the accused
to a fair trial, it runs headlong into the First Amendment's
guarantee of a free press. The author's suggested solution
to what has long constituted a legal dilemma in this
country, is a meticulous adherence to Canon 20 of the Code
of Professional Ethics, which is concerned with ex parte
statements by attorneys to the press as to pending or
anticipated litigation. This is, of course, a laudable suggestion, but it does not protect the accused against a vocal
and publicity-seeking law enforcement officer or prosecutor.
Mr. Williams has given us tasty icing for his multilayer legal cake. In other chapters of this best seller, the
author expounds in a lucid and cogent style his views on
capital punishment, censorship, civil rights, punishing the
sick, the dangers inherent in unlimited police detention,
wire tapping and the use of electronic devices to violate
the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and present day problems incident to a "public
trial" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.
Mr. Williams has authored an extremely interesting
book, one that should hold special appeal to the Bar
generally. It is also a real contribution to those who have
more than just a passing concern for the rights of the
individual, and those precepts of the Constitution concerned with such rights.
C. MAuRIcE FIxNN*
Of the Maryland Bar; LL.B. 1946, University of Virginia.

